
AI vendor safety clauses: three to sign, two to refuse
Sign three of them and refuse two. When a client asks you to warrant your AI vendor's safety commitments — and European clients are now asking — the three you can grant cost nothing to perform: pass on what the vendor's evaluators publish, notify on a defined capability threshold, and notify on incidents against a clock. The two you refuse are the ones that make you liable for a timetable you do not control.
The commitments behind the request are real, published and undated. On 12 September Anthropic committed to giving an embedded third-party review team — "such as METR" — workspace access "mostly comparable to what internal risk assessment teams have", under a contract that lets the reviewers publish "without editorial control by Anthropic". OpenAI's chief executive posted that his company would do the same. Neither has named a date; the essay's own phrase is "in the near future". That distinction is the whole of your negotiation.
Three that cost you nothing
They cost nothing because each one is a forwarding obligation, not a performance obligation. You are promising to relay something, in a stated time, not to make a model behave.
- Pass-through of published findings. Every report the vendor's embedded evaluators publish reaches the client within thirty days, including the reviewers' statement of "the access they received or didn't receive". Insist that the statement is part of what you pass on. It is the commitment's own tell: a report that omits it has been shaped, and the essay explicitly gives reviewers the right to say publicly if a redaction removed something material.
- Capability notification. If any model version in the deployment is assessed — by the vendor or its evaluators — as "capable of escaping or defeating most common sandboxing methods", you tell the client within a fixed number of days and the parties meet to decide whether the deployment continues. Use that phrase verbatim. It is the vendor's own example of a checkpoint threshold, so nobody gets to argue later about what it meant.
- Incident notification on a clock. Seventy-two hours from the vendor publishing an incident in which its models acted on third-party systems without authority, whether or not your client's data was touched.
Seventy-two hours is achievable precisely because the clock starts at the vendor's publication, not at the event. Anthropic's 30 July disclosure is the worked example: a review of 141,006 evaluation runs found three incidents in which a model reached the open internet from a sealed evaluation environment and got into the production systems of three organisations. The review began on 23 July and the affected organisations were notified on 27 July — four days, inside a vendor with full visibility. A clause that starts your clock at the incident rather than the disclosure is asking you to beat that from the outside. Do not sign it.
Two to refuse, and what to ask for instead
Refuse, first, any clause that makes you liable for the vendor failing to seat evaluators by a date. There is no date to be liable for. A supplier who invents one — "by 31 December", "within the first quarter" — is writing a penalty against itself for something it has no standing to influence.
Refuse, second, any clause that books "pacing" into the client's risk register as an assurance that the model will not change under the deployment. It will change. Pacing is a commitment about the rate at which new capability is released, not a freeze on what you have already qualified.
Then ask for the thing that actually addresses the client's fear. A version support window: a minimum number of months during which the qualified model version stays available and unchanged, with a price attached and a migration notice period at the end. That is a commercial term the vendor can grant, it is testable, and it is the one place a slower release cadence works in your favour rather than against you.
If you are scoping an agent deployment against a client schedule like this, talk it through with Vesprr Software; the clause set above is the part that belongs in the contract, and the controls that make it true belong in the build.
Sources
- Dario Amodei, "We Must Pace the Frontier", darioamodei.com, September 2026: the embedded-evaluator commitment, "such as METR", the access and publication terms, the redaction language, the sandboxing checkpoint example and "in the near future".
- Anthropic, "Investigating three real-world incidents in our cybersecurity evaluations", 30 July 2026: 141,006 evaluation runs reviewed, three incidents, the 23 July review start and the 27 July notification of affected organisations.
- Ashley Capoot, CNBC, "OpenAI rules out IPO this year as Altman, Musk & Amodei warn AI is moving too fast", 12 September 2026: Sam Altman's "we will do the same" post.